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The Logic of Where and While
in the 13th and 14th Centuries
Sara L. Uckelman
Department of Philosophy, Durham University
Abstract
Medieval analyses of molecular propositions include many non-truthfunctional con-
nectives in addition to the standard modern binary connectives (conjunction, dis-
junction, and conditional). Two types of non-truthfunctional molecular propositions
considered by a number of 13th- and 14th-century authors are temporal and local
propositions, which combine atomic propositions with ‘while’ and ‘where’. Despite
modern interest in the historical roots of temporal and tense logic, medieval analy-
ses of ‘while’ propositions are rarely discussed in modern literature, and analyses of
‘where’ propositions are almost completely overlooked. In this paper we introduce
13th- and 14th-century views on temporal and local propositions, and connect the
medieval theories with modern temporal and spatial counterparts.
Keywords: Jean Buridan, Lambert of Auxerre, local propositions, Roger Bacon,
temporal propositions, Walter Burley, William of Ockham
1 Introduction
Modern propositional logicians are familiar with three kinds of compound
propositions: Conjunctions, disjunctions, and conditionals. Thirteenth-century
logicians were more liberal, admitting variously five, six, seven, or more types
of compound propositions. In the middle of the 13th century, Lambert of
Auxerre 1 in his Logic identified six types of ‘hypothetical’ (i.e., compound,
as opposed to atomic ‘categorical’, i.e., subject-predicate, propositions) propo-
sitions: the three familiar ones, plus causal, local, and temporal propositions
[17, ¶99]. Another mid-13th century treatise, Roger Bacon’s Art and Science
of Logic, lists these six and adds expletive propositions (those which use the
connective ‘however’), and other ones not explicitly classified such as “Socrates
1 The identity of the author of this text is not known for certain. Only one manuscript
identifies him further than simply Lambertus, and there his place of origin is given as Ligny-
le-Chaˆtel. Two candidates for who Lambert is have been advanced in the literature: Lambert
of Auxerre, a Dominican and canon of the cathedral of Auxerre in the late 1230s or early
1240s, and Lambert of Lagny, a secular cleric and teacher of Theobald II who later became a
Dominican and a papal penitentiary. The introduction of [17] lays out the arguments for and
against both positions, and comes down in the favor of an attribution of Auxerre. We follow
this status quo here with the caveat that nothing we say turns on his precise identification.
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is such as Plato is”, “Socrates runs as often as Plato argues”, etc. [2, ¶170]).
Numerous other anonymous treatises from the first half of the 13th century in-
clude similar divisions. The Ars Burana (AB) [9, pp. 175–213], dating around
1200 [8, pp. 42, 397], and the Ars Emmerana (AE) [9, pp. 143–174], from the
first half of the 13th century [8, p. 43] both identify the same six types of hy-
pothetical sentences as Lambert, and add a seventh type, the ‘adjunctive’ [9,
pp. 158, 190]. The Dialectica Monacensis (DM) [9, pp. 453–638], composed
between the 1160s and the first decade of the 13th century [8, pp. 410–414]
gives the modern logician’s three types as the primary types, but subdivides
conditionals into a further four categories: temporal, local, causal, and subcon-
ditional [9, p. 484]. 2
From this we can see that the other two of the four main textbooks from
the middle of the century, Peter of Spain’s Summaries of Logic and William of
Sherwood’s Introduction to Logic, are unusual, as neither of them mention these
types of sentences [6, p. 115]; [19, p. 34]. In his early 14th century Summary of
Dialectic, Jean Buridan explains that “some texts do not provide the species
‘temporal’ and ‘local’, because they can be reduced to conjunctive propositions,
for saying ‘Socrates is where Plato is’ amounts to the same as saying ‘Socrates
is somewhere and Plato is there’, and in the same way, saying ‘Socrates lectured
when Plato disputed’ is equivalent to saying ‘Socrates lectured sometime and
then Plato disputed’ ” [3, p. 60]. (Note that this ‘then’ must be interpreted
logically, not temporally.) Despite giving this reduction from temporal or local
sentences to conjunctions, Buridan himself discusses these two types separately
from conjunctive propositions, as do Walter Burley (c. 1275–1344) and William
of Ockham (c. 1287–1347) in their textbooks, ensuring that temporal proposi-
tions remained entrenched in logical discourse throughout the rest of the 14th
century and beyond. 3
Much attention has been devoted to medieval temporal logic since the birth
of modern temporal logic in the works of Arthur Prior, whose debt to medieval
logicians is explicit [22, Ch. 1, §7]. However, the focus has tended to be on
the semantics of tensed categorical propositions (cf. [26,27]), as opposed to the
use of temporal connectives. (Two exception are [20] and [21, ch. 1.8].) When
it comes to local propositions, involving the connective ‘where’, the case is
even worse: We know of no modern investigation of medieval theories of local
propositions (perhaps because so few of the medieval authors discussed these
themselves!).
Thus, our first goal in this paper is to collect and present 13th- and early
14th-century views on the logic of temporal (§2) and local propositions (§4).
Our second aim is to identify and model the formal properties of the medieval
doctrines, so as to compare them to modern approaches. In §3 we consider two
modern approaches to the logic of ‘while’, and show that both of them fail to
2 References to AB, AE, and DM are to the Latin editions; all translations are my own.
3 For example, Richard Lavenham (fl. 1380), Paul of Venice (c. 1369–1429), and John Dorp
(fl. 1499) also discuss temporal propositions [20, pp. 167, 169].
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capture the medieval ideas. We introduce a new definition of ‘while’ that does.
Next, in §5 we provide a spatial analogue of the medieval ‘while’, as well as
look at modern approaches to logics of space and spatial reasoning, including
the logic of elsewhere. We conclude in §6.
2 Temporal propositions
2.1 Temporal propositions in the 13th century
Lambert defines temporal propositions as follows [17, ¶105]:
Definition 2.1 A temporal proposition is one whose parts are joined by the
adverb ‘while’, as in ‘Socrates runs while Plato argues’.
Similar definitions are given in AE [9, pp. 158–159], AB [9, pp. 190–191], and
DM [9, pp. 484–485]. All four definitions crucially include reference to the use of
an adverb; as Bacon notes, local and temporal propositions differ from the other
type of compound propositions because they are complex ‘in virtue of a relation’
rather than a connective [2, ¶170]. Bacon himself doesn’t mention the presence
of an adverb, but that is because he defines local and temporal propositions
by ostension. His example of a temporal proposition is the sentence ‘Socrates
hauls [the boat] in when Plato runs’ [2, ¶170], similar to the examples given
in the other texts, such as AE’s ‘While Socrates runs, Plato moves’ and AB’s
‘Socrates reads while Plato disputes’.
None of Bacon, AE, or DM give truth conditions for temporal propositions.
AB gives the same truth conditions for both temporal and causal propositions:
Definition 2.2 If the antecedent is false and the consequent true, the proposi-
tion is worthless ( nugatoria) [9, p. 191].
The most explicit condition is given by Lambert:
Definition 2.3 A temporal proposition is true if the two actions stated in the
temporal proposition are carried out at the same time; it is false otherwise [17,
¶105]. 4
The same basic idea is expressed in late-12th-century Tractatus Anagnini, when
its author notes that “Generally, every temporal proposition is true of which
each part is true” [9, p. 252]—a definition which supports Buridan’s contention
that some authors treated temporal propositions as if they were conjunctions.
2.2 Temporal propositions in the 14th century
The 14th-century views are distinguished from the 13th-century accounts by
their sophistication; they are more nuanced, and have greater scope.
Ockham, Buridan, and Burley define the syntax of temporal propositions
and their truth conditions almost identically to Lambert; however, all three
include a constraint, namely that a temporal proposition be composed “out
of categoricals mediated by a temporal adverb” [4, p. 127], [3, p. 65], [18,
p. 191]. This has a consequence of disallowing embedded temporal propositions.
4 More accurately, it is “in the same time”; the Latin phrase is in eodem tempore [7, p. 17].
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Additionally, Ockham allows temporal propositions to be composed out of more
than two propositions [18, p. 191] (though he gives no explanation of how this
would be done, and all his examples involve only two).
Of all the accounts we consider, Ockham’s and Burley’s are the most de-
tailed. They both allow for temporal adverbs beyond those signifying simul-
taneity, such as those indicating priority or posteriority in the temporal order.
Examples of temporal adverbs of the first type include dum ‘while, as long as,
until’ and quando ‘when, at which time’, while examples of the second type
include ante ‘before’, post and postquam ‘after’, and priusquam ‘before, un-
til’ [4, p. 128]. For temporal adverbs indicating simultaneity, Burley gives the
following truth conditions:
Definition 2.4 For the truth of a temporal [proposition], in which categorical
propositions are conjoined by means of an adverb conveying simultaneity of
time, it is required that both parts be true for the same time [4, p. 128].
This condition is further specified depending on whether the time signified is
present, past, or future:
For if the parts of such a temporal [proposition] are propositions of the
present, then it is required that both parts be now true for this present
time, and if it is of the past, it is required that both parts were true for some
past time, this is, because they themselves were true in the present tense
for some past time. And if they are propositions of the future, then it is
required that both parts be true for some future time, that is, because they
themselves will be true in the present tense for some future time [4, p. 128].
Thus, the truth conditions of temporal propositions will depend on the tenses
of the sentences being conjoined with the temporal adverb.
There is an important point in which the 14th-century truth conditions
offered by Ockham and Burley differ from the 13th-century ones as typified
by Lambert, a point which Buridan makes explicit. Lambert requires that the
two actions indicated by the temporal propositions are carried out “at the same
time”, and his view is typical of the 13th century. However, the 14th-century
conditions change at to for. Buridan makes this point explicitly, grounded in
his token-based semantics which allows for a distinction between a proposition
being ‘true of’ vs. being ‘true at’ something [23,25]:
It does not suffice for its categoricals to be true at the same time; for the
propositions ‘Aristotle existed’ and ‘The Antichrist will exist’ are true at the
same time, namely now, but it is required and sufficient that the copulas of
the categoricals consignify the same time and that they be true for the same
time, although not at that time [3, p. 65].
That is, given that the propositions which go into a temporal proposition can
themselves be tensed, there is a difference between ‘while’ statements where
the time of reference is the same and ‘while’ statements where the time of
evaluation is the same. Which is taken as primary is one of the ways in which
the 14th-century views differ from the 13th-century views.
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For adverbs indicating something other than simultaneity, Ockham notes
that it is necessary that “the propositions [be] true for different times” [18,
p. 191]. 5 He also notes that these two conditions do not exclude each other:
‘The apostles preached while Christ preached’ and ‘The apostles preached after
Christ preached’ are consistent with each other [18, p. 191]. Both Ockham
and Burley are also the only ones to consider when a temporal proposition
is necessary, impossible, or contingent: “In order for a temporal proposition
to be necessary it is required that each part be necessary” [18, p. 191], [4,
p. 129]. Given the definitions of impossibility and contingency in terms of
necessity and negation, the conditions under which a temporal proposition is
impossible or contingent follow naturally [18, p. 192]. A consequence of this
definition is that many statements which seem to be expressing necessities, such
as ‘Wood becomes warm when fire is brought near it’, or ‘A donkey is risible
when it is a man’, are not necessary, because neither of their parts is necessary
(and in the case of the second example, both parts are necessarily false) [18,
p. 191]. These only look like they are necessary because if we interpreted them
as conditionals rather than temporal statements, they would be always true,
and hence necessary [18, p. 192].
From these definitions, Burley offers a few corollaries concerning inferences
involving temporal propositions:
Corollary 2.5 The negation ( oppositum) of a temporal [proposition] is a dis-
junction composed from the opposites of those which were required for the truth
of the temporal [4, p. 131].
However, this is merely a sufficient condition for the falsity of the temporal
proposition; it is not a necessary condition.
Corollary 2.6 A temporal [proposition] implies both of its parts, and not con-
versely [4, p. 131].
Corollary 2.7 A temporal [proposition] implies a conjunction made of the
temporal parts, but not conversely [4, p. 131].
The second two can also be found in Ockham [18, p. 192].
3 The logic of while
Let P and F be the usual backward- and forward-facing unary temporal pos-
sibility operators and  be universal necessity, both past and future. Our
temporal models T = 〈W,≤, V 〉 are linear and continuous, reflecting the fact
that for the medievals, ‘time’ and ‘place’ are two of the five continuous quan-
tities. These two are differentiated from the other three—line, surface, and
body—in that time and place both have corresponding categories, the cate-
gories of ‘when’ and ‘where’ (cf. [17, ¶561]). We define the truth conditions of
these operators in the usual fashion:
5 The same condition is given for both ‘after’ and ‘before’, which is clearly incomplete.
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Definition 3.1 (Unary temporal operators) For w ∈W :
w  Pp iff there is w′ ≤ w,w′  p
w  Fp iff there is w′ ≥ w,w′  p
w  p iff for all w′, w′  p
That some medieval authors argue that temporal propositions are reducible to
conjunctions, while others argue that they are a type of conditional is grounded
in the intuition that, in principle, there are two ways in which ‘the same time’
can be construed, either existentially or universally. In the first, temporal state-
ments are equivalent to conjunctions, while in the second, temporal statements
are equivalent to strict implications. We introduce Q (quando ‘while’, ‘at every
time’) as a binary connective ‘while’ 6 . The two cases then are:
(i) w  pQq iff there exists w′, w′  p and w′  q.
(ii) w  pQq iff for all w′, if w′  q then w′  p.
In order to see which of these is correct, we must make more precise the way
in which temporal compounds interact with tensed propositions.
Case (i) can be divided into three possibilities: (a) w = w′, (b) w < w′, and
(c) w′ < w. Case (a) corresponds to the case when p and q are both present-
tensed statements referring to now, in which case, if time is not extended (that
is, propositions are true or false at single points, or instants, of time), then
for any two present-tensed propositions p and q, pQq is equivalent to p ∧ q:
For the only way in which two present-tensed propositions can be true at the
same time is if they are true now, and if now is a single instant, this means
they must both be true at this instant, which is equivalent to their conjunction
being true. If two present-tensed propositions are both true now, then they are
true at the same instant, and hence each is true while the other is true. Cases
(b) and (c) correspond to when the point of reference is either in the past or in
the future, that is, statements such as ‘Socrates lectured while Plato disputed’
or—forgive the somewhat awkward English grammar—‘Socrates will lecture
while Plato will dispute’. Let us focus on the past-tensed case: Given that the
components of ‘Socrates lectured while Plato disputed’ are ‘Socrates lectured’
and ‘Plato disputed’, themselves past-tensed, it would be natural to formalize
this as a ‘while’ connective between two past-tensed statements, e.g., PpQPq,
in analogy to when the atomic statements are present-tensed. However, it is not
clear that this gets the truth conditions right. On an Ockham-Buridan-Burley
account, ‘Socrates lectured while Plato disputed’ being true implies that there
was a time for which both propositions were true, i.e., P (p ∧ q). By ordinary
temporal reasoning this implies Pp ∧ Pq, but from Pp ∧ Pq, one cannot make
the reverse inference, because there is no guarantee that the time for which p
is true and the time for which q is true is the same, a fact which both Ockham
and Burley point out. Ockham says:
6 We use Q rather than W to avoid confusion with both W a set of worlds and with ‘where’.
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w w′′ w′
p
q
¬p
q
p
q
Fig. 1. w  pQq
. . . a conjunctive proposition follows from a temporal proposition—but not
conversely. For this does not follow: ‘Adam existed and Noah existed, there-
fore Adam existed when Noah existed’. Nor does this follow: ‘Jacob existed
and Esau existed, therefore Jacob existed when Esau existed’ [18, p. 192]. 7
Whether PpQPq implies P (p ∧ q) depends on how, precisely, we interpret Q.
In modern temporal logic, the ‘while’ operator is most commonly found in
the context of dynamic temporal logic, where ‘while ϕ, do α’ constructions are
commonly used. It is clear that this imperative, dynamic conception of ‘while’
is not what the medieval logicians had in mind. Instead, their notion is static.
Modern static temporal logic tends to omit discussion of ‘while’, taking as basic
instead the forward-looking U ‘until’ and the backward-looking S ‘since’:
Definition 3.2 (Weak until) For w ∈W :
w  pUq iff if there is a w′ ≥ w s.t. w′  q
then for every w′′, w ≤ w′′ < w′, w′′  p
S is defined symmetrically.
Malachi and Owicki use this weak notion of ‘until’ to define a correspondingly
weak notion of ‘while’ [14, p. 206]: 8
Definition 3.3 (Malachi & Owicki ‘while’) For w ∈W :
w  pQq iff w  pU(¬q)
iff if there is a w′ ≥ w s.t. w′  ¬q
then for every w′′, w ≤ w′′ < w′, w′′  p
Intuitively, defining ‘while’ in terms of ‘until’ makes sense, for “p is true while q
is true” seems to mean nothing more than “p is true until q is false”. However,
the ‘until’ used in the English sentence here is not the same as the weak until
defined in Definition 3.2, since if q is always true, then the antecedent will be
false and p can be either true or false, as illustrated in Figure 1. As a result,
we must reject Malachi and Owicki’s definition as unsuitable. An alternative
analysis of ‘while’ is given in [15, p. 260]:
7 Burley’s example is similar: “Adam was when Noah was, therefore Adam was and Noah
was” follows, but “Adam was and Noah was, therefore Adam was when Noah was” does not
[4, p. 131].
8 They read pQq as “q is true as long as p is true”, but this cannot be a correct interpretation
of pU(¬q).
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t1 t2 t3 t4 t5
p
¬q
¬p
q
Pp
Pq
Pp
Pq
Pp
Pq
Fig. 2. t3  PpQPq ∧ ¬P (p ∧ q)
Definition 3.4 (Manna & Pnueli ‘while’) For w ∈W :
w  pQq iff w′  p for every w′ ≥ w such that
w′′  q for all w′′, w ≤ w′′ ≤ w′
But this also fails to capture the medieval account, in two ways. First, on this
definition, PpQPq does not imply P (p ∧ q). When p and q are past-tensed
statements, it is possible for them to both be true at the same time without
there being any time for which the present-tense conjunction is true (see Figure
2), which is contrary to what Ockham and Burley argue for above. Thus, if
we were to adopt these truth conditions for Q, ‘Socrates lectured while Plato
disputed’ could not be formalized as a temporal compound of two past-tensed
sentences. This raises two questions: (1) How should it be formalized?, and
(2) What, if anything, does PpQPq represent, given that it appears to be
well-formed?
We answer the second question first, by returning to Buridan’s distinction of
a proposition being true for a time vs. being true at a time; this is a distinction
between the time of evaluation and the time of reference. In Figure 2, Pp and
Pq are true at the same time, namely t3, but they are not true for the same
time; Pp is true for t1, because t1 is the witness for the truth of Pp at t3, while
Pq is true for t2, because t2 is the witness for the truth of Pq at t3. Thus, Buri-
dan would reject PpQPq as an appropriate analysis of temporal compounds of
past-tensed sentences. However, one needn’t deny the acceptability of the ‘true
at’ analysis, and indeed, inspection of the 13th-century views show that this
is precisely how they differ from the 14th-century ones: Recall that Lambert
says that a temporal proposition is true “if the two actions stated in the tem-
poral proposition are carried out at the same time”, rather than that the two
actions described are true for the same time. In taking this account, he shows
similarities with Peter Abelard’s views in the middle of the 12th century. As
Martin describes Abelard’s views:
The compound temporal proposition formed from the two propositions
‘Socrates was a youth’ and ‘Socrates was an infant’ is true at a given time,
[Abelard] tells us, just in case each component is true at that time, and so
true now of the old Socrates [16, p. 165].
Martin doesn’t say how the compound proposition is formed from these two
statements, and if it is merely ‘Socrates was an infant while Socrates was a
youth’, then this statement should never be true, since being an infant excludes
being a youth. However, if the compound proposition expresses that these two
past-tensed statements can be true at (as opposed to for) the same time, e.g.,
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t1 t2 t3 t4 t5¬p
q
¬(pQq)
p
q
pQq
p
q
pQq P (pQq) P (pQq)
Fig. 3. t4  P (pQq)
‘Socrates was a youth is true at the same time as Socrates was an infant is
true’, then this is true any time Socrates is alive and was both previously an
infant and previously a youth.
Ideally, we would like an account of ‘while’ which doesn’t require us to
exclude either the true for or the true at analysis, and which treats both of
these in a uniform fashion. If we adopt PpQPq, i.e., applying the tenses directly
to the atomic propositions, to indicate that the two tensed propositions are true
at the same time, then the natural alternative to represent the ‘true for’ case
is to make the entire temporal compound past-tensed, e.g., P (pQq). Figure 3
gives a model where P (pQq) is true. From this figure, it should be clear that
P (pQq) will always imply PpQPq, but not conversely. It should also be clear
that ϕQψ implies ϕ ∧ ψ, regardless of the tenses of the individual components
ϕ and ψ, and regardless of the tense of the entire compound, from which it
follows that P (pQq) implies Pp ∧ Pq, but also not conversely.
A problem still remains with analysing Q via the conditions given in Defi-
nition 3.4. When p and q are both present-tensed, if q is always false, pQq will
always be true. 9 For Definition 3.4 can be rewritten, informally, as “for every
w′ ≥ w, if w′′’s being between w and w′ implies that w′′  q, then w′  p. When
q is always false, w′′’s being between w and w′ does not imply that w′′  q, and
hence the antecedent of the conditional is falsified, making the entire condition
satisfied. But this goes against the medieval requirement that pQq imply p∧ q.
If we add this requirement to Definition 3.4, we obtain a characterization of
Q that captures the medieval account, wherein pQq implies p ∧ q but is not
implied by it:
Definition 3.5 (Medieval ‘while’) For w ∈W :
w  pQq iff w  p ∧ q and for all w′ ≥ w
if for all w′′, w ≤ w′′ < w′, w′′  q then w′  p
An advantage of this account is that it helps understand why some medieval
authors try to reduce temporal propositions to conjunctions and others to im-
plications, because the truth conditions have both conjunctive and implicative
9 A similar objection can be levied against Kro¨ger’s definition of Q [13, p. 22]: For w ∈W :
w  pQq iff (1) there is w′ > w s.t. w′  ¬q and
for all w′′, w < w′′ < w′, w′′  p or
(2) for all w′ > w,w′  p
Because the relations are strict, there is no requirement for p ∧ q to be true at w.
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conditions. A further advantage is that on this definition we are able to prove
that Ockham’s account of the necessity of temporal propositions is correct:
Lemma 3.6 (Ockham) (pQq) iff p ∧q.
Proof. Fix w ∈W .
(⇒) If w  (pQq), then for all w′, w′  pQq. By Definition 3.5, w′  p∧ q,
so w  (p ∧ q). Since necessity distributes, w  p ∧q.
(⇐) If w  p ∧q, then w  (p ∧ q). By Definition 3.1, for all w′ ∈ W ,
w′  p ∧ q, and in particular, w′  p. From this it follows that for all w′′ <
w′ ∈ W , w′′  q implies w′  p, and for any w ≤ w′′, w  pQq. But since w′
was arbitrary, this holds of all w ∈W , so w  (pQq). 2
4 Local propositions
The 13th-century discussions of local propositions are not as extensive, and
resemble each other quite a bit. AE [9, p. 159], AB [9, p. 191], and DM [9,
p. 485] all give similar accounts which closely resemble Lambert’s definition:
Definition 4.1 (Lambert) A local proposition is one whose parts are joined
by the adverb ‘where’, as in ‘Socrates runs where Plato argues’ [17, ¶104].
Bacon says that ‘Socrates is where Plato is’ is called local, and this is a com-
plex proposition in virtue of a relation (namely ‘being in the same place as’)
instead of a connective [2, ¶170], treating the syntactic construction of local
propositions analogously to temporal ones. Of the 13th-century authors, only
Lambert provides any truth conditions:
Definition 4.2 (Lambert) A local proposition is true if the two actions stated
in the local proposition are carried out in the same place; it is false otherwise
[2, ¶104].
The 14th-century discussions of local propositions are more detailed, but still
relatively circumscribed compared to the temporal analyses. Buridan’s defi-
nition of local propositions mirrors his definition of temporal ones, with the
difference that ‘temporal adverb’ is replaced with ‘local adverb’ and ‘when’
with ‘where’ (though he notes it is possible to replace the local adverb with an
equivalent phrase, such as ‘Socrates is in the place in which Plato is’ [3, p. 66]).
For their truth, he provides a necessary but not sufficient condition:
Definition 4.3 (Buridan) A local proposition is true if “both categoricals
[are] true for the place designated by the word ‘where’, and it is not sufficient
that they are true for the same place” [3, p. 66].
Thus, local propositions will entail conjunctions but not vice versa, as with
temporal propositions.
Ockham allows local propositions to be composed of more than two cate-
goricals [18, p. 192], as he does with temporal propositions and with the same
caveat noted earlier. An interesting point of textual interpretation arises in the
statement of the truth conditions. Some manuscripts say that “for the truth
of [a local] proposition, it is required that each part be true for the same place
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or for different places” while others give the last clause as “and not for differ-
ent places” (emphasis added) [18, pp. 193, 205]. There is clear evidence that
the latter reading should be preferred: After giving this condition, Ockham
points it out as the very characteristic by which local propositions differ from
temporal ones:
In this regard it [a local proposition] differs from a temporal one. For in
order for a temporal proposition to be true it is required that both parts
be true for the same place or for different places, while in order for a local
proposition to be true it is required that both parts be true for the same
place and not for different places [18, p. 193]. 10
For local propositions to be distinguished from temporal ones on precisely these
grounds, it must be the case that one of the two causes of truth is excluded.
Burley does not discuss local propositions as a separate type. Instead, he says
that local propositions such ‘Socrates is moved where he runs’ are reducible
to one of the five basic types of hypothetical propositions: conditional, causal,
temporal, conjunctive, and disjunctive [4, p. 107]. He does not say which,
but from other accounts, it is clear that local propositions are analogous to
temporal ones.
5 The logic of where
It is important to note that we have the same “true at (or in)” vs. “true for”
distinction for local propositions that we had for temporal ones. Therefore, we
should expect our analysis of the logic of where to account for this distinction,
as we required of our logic of while.
The first, and simplest, modern attempt to capture a local notion in modal
logic is the logic of elsewhere introduced by von Wright [29] and completely
axiomatized by Segerberg [24]. In this system,  is interpreted as ‘everywhere
else’ and 3 is read as ‘somewhere else’; the frames for this logic are ones where
xRy iff x 6= y, that is, R is the relation of nonidentity. The logic of elsewhere
is the smallest normal modal logic containing all instances of the schemata: 11
A: p→ (p→ p)
B: p→ 3p
This logic, of course, describes exactly the opposite of what we need to capture
the medieval analyses, because what we want is not the logic of elsewhere
but the logic of, so to say, ‘here’. However, the natural approach, taking
R as identity, is clearly not correct: Such a system would collapse into the
trivial system Triv. Adopting this would make local propositions equivalent to
conjunctions and destroy the analogy with temporal propositions, something
which all medieval authors we consider maintain.
10The italicized portion is our correction of the reading in the translation “or for”, following
the other manuscript tradition.
11 In [10,11], axiom A is replaced by the axiom 33p→ (p ∨3p).
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Since von Wright, substantially more complex spatial logics, such as ones
characterizing topological notions such as ‘nearness’ and ‘distance’, have been
introduced [1,28]. These logics are aimed at capturing what Aiello and van
Bentham call “the ontological structure [of space]: What are the primitive
objects and their relations?” [1, p. 320]. This approach can be contrasted with
one that looks at “some existing human practice, e.g., a language with spatial
expressions (say locative propositions) or a diagrammatic way of visualizing
things” [1, p. 320], and identifies and classifies the types of spatial structures
that ‘fit’ these linguistic expressions. Many modern modal logicians prefer the
former approach, whereas clearly here it is the latter that will be most beneficial
for understanding the medieval practices: It is how we use local propositions,
not the nature of the underlying structure of space, that guides the correct
analysis of ‘where’ compounds.
All of the authors we have looked at agree that temporal propositions and
local propositions should be treated analogously (though not necessarily iden-
tically: As noted in the previous section Ockham requires that the component
propositions not be true for different places): ‘where’ is substituted for ‘while’,
‘same place’ is substituted for ‘same time’. We begin with looking at how far the
analogy between local propositions and temporal propositions can be pushed,
specifically at our assumptions concerning the nature of time and whether they
are appropriate to transfer to space. We first point out a clear disanalogy be-
tween local propositions and temporal ones. The truth of ‘p where q’ does not
depend on the place of evaluation, whereas the truth of pQq depends on the
time of evaluation. This reflects the fact that if no explicit time is specified, a
temporal proposition must have both of its temporal parts true now; but if no
explicit place is specified, a local proposition can be true without either of its
parts being true here. A consequence of this is that we can ignore location when
considering temporal propositions, but we cannot ignore time or tense when
considering local propositions, for it is perfectly natural to say such things as
“I will walk where Socrates disputed” or “That church stands where a Roman
temple used to stand”. In order for sentences like these to be sensible, we need
to evaluate propositions not merely at places, but at place/time pairs. This
will be reflected below when we evaluate local propositions in R3.
One assumption about time that we did not address explicitly in the pre-
vious section is whether time is point-based or extended (i.e., interval-based).
We adopted a point-based approach without comment, for two reasons: First,
it is within the bounds of medieval approaches to temporal reasoning to con-
sider at least some statements as being true or false at instants 12 , even though
many sentences express propositions that are extended in duration. 13 Second,
1213th- and 14th-century literature on incipit ‘begins’ and desinit ‘ceases’ define these in
terms of instants.
13For example, DM’s example is “When the sun is above the earth, it is day” [9, p. 485]
(rewritable into the equivalent “it is day while the sun is above the earth”), or the other
examples involving activities of extended duration such as walking, reading, and disputing,
all of which are more naturally suited to evaluation at intervals than at points.
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actions with extended duration are taken into account by the second conjunct
of the truth conditions in Definition 3.5; while intervals are not used in the
definition under that name, it is clear that the truth of every temporal propo-
sition depends upon intervals bounded below by some point where p∧ q is true
and extending until q is false. 14 If we adopt the same approach for space,
we are committed to the view that an infinite number of actions can occur
at a single spatial point; while this is unproblematic for temporal points, it
may be less palatable for spatial points. As an alternative, we could adopt an
approach where regions rather than points are taken as basic, such that truth
in a region does not necessarily propagate down to subregions. For example,
taking an entire football pitch as a region, if Socrates is disputing on the left
half while Plato is running on the right half, “Socrates is disputing where Plato
is running” is true for the entire pitch; but it is false for either of the individual
halves. However, on an alternative view of events, they “unlike material ob-
jects, do not occupy the space at which they are located” [5, p. 17], meaning we
can, in principle, allow for an infinite number of events happening at a single
point, even if the material objects acting in those events do not co-exist at that
point.
A further assumption that we made about the nature of time—that it is
linear—is not plausible for space. Dropping linearity means that we are no
longer looking at points and intervals on a line but rather points in R2 and 2D
regions around these points, regions which will fill the same role as intervals
play in the temporal case. These regions need to be ‘well-behaved’ or ‘normal’
in some intuitive sense: They shouldn’t be disjoint, they shouldn’t contain
holes, 15 they should be extended in the spatial dimensions only, etc. How
precisely this notion of ‘region’ is to be defined is ultimately immaterial—
many different possibilities are acceptable, and we do not wish to discriminately
unduly—but since we need a definition, we take the following:
Definition 5.1 (Neighborhood) A set A ⊂ R2 is a neighborhood of a point
(x, y) ∈ R2 if A contains an open set containing (x, y). 16
Definition 5.2 (Region) Let (x, y) ∈ R2. We say that R(x, y) = A is a
region of (x, y) if A is a simply connected neighborhood of (x, y). 17
This captures the definition of ‘where’ given by Lambert, quoting the anony-
14 It is for this reason that hybrid approaches are not immediately adaptable to our present
needs, because in standard hybrid logics, nominals range over time points, not time intervals.
15The requirement that regions not have holes may be too strong. For suppose that Socrates
is a moderately good hammer thrower, such that no hammer he throws ever lands less than
1 meter from him. However, he’s not very good, so they could land in any direction. Then,
one might want the region referred to in the sentence “Plato walks where Socrates’s hammers
fall” to be a torus, rather than a circle. If this example, suggested to me by Charles Walker, is
motivating enough, the requirement of simple connectedness in Definition 5.1 can be dropped.
16An alternative definition of ‘neighborhood’ requires that A itself be the open set containing
(x, y), rather than merely containing an open set, but we do not need this constraint.
17Note that this differs from the definition of ‘regions’ as ‘regular closed sets’ in [12, p. 514].
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mous author of the 12th-century Book of Six Principles: 18
“[W]here is the circumscription of a body proceeding from the circumscrip-
tion of a place.” For example, water collected in a container adopts the figure
of the container and is transfigured in accord with the figure of the interior
surface of the container, and the configuration that it has from the interior
surface of the container is named ‘where’ [17, ¶567]. 19
We are now in a position to define the binary local connective ‘U ’ (ubi ‘where’),
analogous to ‘Q but replacing intervals with regions, representing ‘wheres’:
Definition 5.3 (Medieval ‘where’) For (t, x, y) ∈ (R3,≤):
(t, x, y)  pUq iff there is x′, y′ s.t. (t, x′, y′)  p ∧ q and for all R(x′, y′),
if for all (x′′, y′′) ∈ R(x′, y′), (t, x′′, y′′)  q
then for all (x′′, y′′) ∈ R(x′, y′), (t, x′′, y′′)  p
We then redefine the truth conditions for the relevant unary temporal operators
with a specification of place:
Definition 5.4 For (t, x, y) ∈ (R3,≤):
(t, x, y)  Pp iff there is t′ ≤ t, (t′, x, y)  p
(t, x, y)  Fp iff there is t′ ≥ t, (t′, x, y)  p
(t, x, y)  p iff for all t′, (t′, x, y)  p
Because the place is kept fixed, this is equivalent to Definition 3.1 when the
place is unspecified. Updating Definition 3.5 to include reference to place is
also straightforward.
6 Conclusion
One of the most interesting scientific results of the 20th century was the pro-
duction of a model under which time and place can be considered in symmetric
fashion: One can simply treat the dimension of time as another dimension on
a par with the three dimensions of space, length, breadth, and width. This
parity is arguably reflected in the medieval theories we’ve discussed: We have
seen a variety of 13th- and 14th-century views of temporal and local propo-
sitions, on which the analyses of being true at the same time and being true
at the same place are (almost) symmetric, and both arise from natural uses
of everyday language. We gave truth conditions for the operators Q and U
which both capture the medieval views concerning the analogous structure and
truth conditions of these operators as well as provide interesting alternatives
to modern approaches. Our definition of Q differs from two modern defini-
tions by requiring the implication from pQq to p ∧ q, while our definition of
18And that author in turn takes the definition from Aristotle’s Physics.
19Note that this example is three-dimensional. In our discussion, we are restricting our-
selves to the two-dimensional case, but only for simplicity’s sake. Our definitions should be
generalizable.
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U is unique. This paper is only a first step to a complete analysis: The next
step after defining the semantics would be to identify the characteristic axioms
governing these new operators. We will pursue this in future work.
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